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Operations Other Than War

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IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE U.S. Army

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Operations Other Than War

Implications for the U.S. Army

Jennifer Morrison Taw

John E. Peters

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Arroyo Center

Prepared for the
United States Army

RAND

PREFACE

This monograph was prepared as part of a project entitled "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)" carried out in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The purpose of this project was to assess how demographic changes will affect future conflict (limited conventional fighting as well as nonconventional fighting, e.g., insurgency) and U.S. Army combat (conventional and counterinsurgency) as well as noncombat missions (e.g., peacekeeping, civil affairs, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief). In addition, it examined the range of potential new Army deployments in the less-developed world, including:

- Army roles and missions in support of either unilateral or multinational deployment efforts;
- Army roles and missions in postconflict reconstitution and reconstruction;
- Army roles and missions as part of, or in support of, peacekeeping operations.

The first phase of the project focused on the effects of urbanization and population growth in the developing world and, more specifically, on the implications of these demographic trends for the Middle East and for the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations.

The project's second phase included several case studies representing the range of missions and requirements the United States is likely to face in the future, paying particular attention to the following: Army roles and missions in providing relief and humanitarian assistance to refugees; involvement, and the implications of intervening, in internal ethnic conflicts; and peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in urban settings.

This monograph was written for the project's final phase. It supports the suggestion that U.S. forces will continue to be involved in operations other than war, describes the operational requirements of such missions, and makes specific recommendations for the U.S. Army regarding doctrine, training, equipment, and force structure. It concludes by summarizing which kinds of operations other than war the United States has proven competence in and which are more difficult. This monograph should be of interest to officers of the Army Staff and its field operating agencies engaged in these issues.

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SUMMARY

Post-Cold War political pressures are likely to increase the demand for the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in particular to conduct operations other than war.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Although the political-military changes that have taken place with the end of the Cold War garner much attention, even more critical is their convergence with unprecedented demographic upheaval. Population growth has been a concern since even before Malthus, and it is actually slowing worldwide, but in the least developed countries of the world it is increasing. These same countries are also experiencing rapid urbanization—without the concomitant benefit of a technological revolution to provide jobs in the growing cities or to replace workers in the depleted countryside. Moreover, these trends are compounded by internal and international population migration that situates large numbers of people outside such infrastructures as do exist and places tremendous demands on governments already suffering from limited resources and, often, political fragility.

The results of such trends are predictable: increased crime, perhaps organized; greater popular discontent leading to greater odds of terrorism and insurgency; inability of governments to respond to natural disasters; and humanitarian crises, such as host governments becoming overwhelmed by refugees. One needs merely to look at current events in Haiti, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and the Sudan, among others, to see evidence of the effects of converging political changes and demographic trends.

This global situation has direct relevance for the U.S. Army, and for the military more generally. First, the United States will not be able to avoid all involvement in the kinds of crises that arise from these circumstances. Although such involvement is likely to be primarily diplomatic and political, there will still be situations that demand U.S. military intervention. Indeed, while many Americans were arguing in late 1993 that the United States had learned from events in Somalia not to become embroiled in such internal conflagrations, by mid-1994 the United States had sent troops to Rwanda and to Haiti. The kinds of military operations required in these circumstances are usually not conventional battlefield operations, but operations other than war (OOTW), including noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics.

In addition to the probability of continued U.S. involvement in future OOTW, the above-mentioned demographic trends have implications for the nature of the operations. For example, larger, more urbanized populations are likely to lead to more military operations in cities, towns, and villages, and those operations will probably be constrained to preserve infrastructure and avoid collateral damage. Population migration not only has implications in terms of refugee control, it may also demand humanitarian efforts within operations that otherwise would not be complicated by such considerations as feeding, housing, and providing water, sanitation, and medical attention to an indigenous population. The United States military, which is itself in the process of changing, will face a future of new and complicated challenges, and it will need to assess what, if any, adjustments to doctrine, training, equipping, and force structure will be required to respond effectively.

KEY FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN OOTW

The United States has had mixed success in recent attempts to conduct operations other than war. Examination of the case studies conducted in the second phase of this project¹ demonstrates some

¹The case studies from which this report draws include Mary E. Morris's work on demographic pressures and political instability in the Middle East; Michael T. Childress

shared characteristics among a variety of OOTW over the past decade and also suggests that two main factors have influenced U.S. success or failure in the past: political-military communication and mission creep/mission swing, which affect whether operations are clearly guided by defined political objectives and whether the operational environment is dynamic or static.

Political-Military Communications

In OOTW, more than any other kind of military operation, the “marriage” of political and military objectives must be extremely close. Whereas the strategies, operational requirements, and tactics of conventional battlefield warfare derive from broadly writ political directives—usually “seize territory” and “defeat the enemy”—most OOTW may have political goals that are much more complex and subtle and that infuse military decisionmaking at the most picayune levels of detail. So even though military missions have always derived from political objectives, the multifaceted political goals of OOTW are likely to complicate the development of clear military missions to a degree not encountered in earlier wars.

In order for this “marriage” to work, the military and political leadership must achieve an unprecedented level of communication. Without it, military planning may be derived from misleading political rhetoric or, alternatively, political decisions may be based on faulty understandings of military capabilities or considerations. Either situation endangers the success of the entire effort and, in many cases,

and Paul A. McCarthy, *Implications for the U.S. Army of Demographic Patterns in the Less Developed World: A Documented Briefing*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-256-A, 1994; Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-398-A, 1994; Paul A. McCarthy, *Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-374-A, 1994; Benjamin C. Schwarz, *NATO at the Crossroads: Reexamining America's Role in Europe*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, IP-133-A, 1994; Mary E. Morris's work on the liberation of Kuwait City during Operation Desert Storm; Jennifer Morrison Taw's work on Operation Just Cause; Jennifer Morrison Taw's work on the role of Special Operations Forces in peace operations; John C. Schmeidel's study of the Marine barracks bombing of 1983; Graham A. Fuller's examination of conflict, refugees, and demographic change in Afghanistan; Margaret Cecchine Harrell's study of traditional peacekeeping in Cyprus; Glenys A. Babcock's work on UNEF I and UNEF II; a study of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia; and, John E. Peters' analyses of military phases of OOTW and force tailoring for OOTW.

the lives of the soldiers and civilians participating in the operation. Communication must therefore be mutual, frank, specific, and continual.

Mission Creep/Mission Swing

Political-military communication is even more critical as operational environments shift rapidly and political goals are achieved or transformed. In such cases, there is a window for the political determination as to how best to proceed or whether to proceed.

Unlike more traditional military missions, OOTW do not move linearly from one set of tasks and objectives to another in a predictable fashion. In OOTW, military activities may careen from peacekeeping to coercive measures and back to cooperative actions. Such rapid shifts can be caused by two very different, but often interactive, phenomena: (1) *mission creep*, new or shifting political guidance requiring military operations different from those initially planned and (2) *mission swing*, a change in mission in response to the quick deterioration or improvement of the operational environment unrelated to the intervening forces' presence or efforts.

Each of these two phenomena can require rapid decisions as to whether the intervening military forces should—depending on the circumstances—desist from their planned activities, adjust their planned activities, conduct completely new activities, or withdraw altogether. Such a decision must involve both the policymakers and military leaders of the intervening country, to ensure that it reflects not only the current political objectives and situation appraisal, but also the military commanders' assessments of the practical requirements generated by the changing circumstances and their capabilities for responding.

Even prior to an OOTW, however, military commanders must anticipate abrupt changes in mission or rapid deterioration of the political-military circumstances in which the mission is performed, and task organize appropriately. They must recognize that although the United States has historically performed very well in operations where political objectives are well defined and communicated, *and* where the operational environment is static and predictable (whether war or peace), U.S. operations have been more problematic

when one or both of those conditions does not hold—and it is likely that in most future OOTW, the operational environment will be dynamic and the political guidance obscure or changeable.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to these general challenges, a number of specific requirements for future U.S. military participation in OOTW become evident from the case studies. Force structure, equipping, doctrine, and training all require some adjustment if U.S. forces are to be adequately prepared for future OOTW. Yet the Army cannot be expected to shift overnight from the conventional “concept” to an emphasis on OOTW. Concerns about how preparing for OOTW might affect readiness for conventional combat continue to spur debate. While some in the Army recognize that involvement in OOTW is inevitable and are already adjusting doctrine and training, others prefer to continue to think of OOTW as they thought of low intensity conflict (LIC): as a lesser-included contingency for which any well-prepared conventional military is automatically prepared. This debate is constructive, and should ultimately result in a well-balanced military, but more immediate adjustments are nonetheless necessary, for involvement in OOTW will not wait until the debate has been resolved. There are some simple adjustments to force structure, equipping, doctrine, and training that can help the Army be better prepared for OOTW today, without requiring sacrifice of readiness for larger contingencies. These are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

CONCLUSION

Operations other than war provide a unique set of challenges to the U.S. Army, and to the U.S. military more generally. In addition to the evolving nature of operations and the requirements imposed by such new considerations as the increased likelihood of operations on urbanized terrain and the greater possibility of humanitarian components being part of any operation, there are the additional requirements and concerns that arise when such operations are conducted in dynamic operational environments or with unclear and/or shifting political guidance. This monograph offers a simple framework for

considering the nature of OOTW, as well as some practical recommendations for all OOTW, regardless of their nature.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Air Force Pamphlet
AN/TPQ-36	Firefinder mortar locating radar
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
CA	Civil Affairs
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander-in-chief
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center
CMO	Civil-military operations
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORPSAM	Corps Surface-to-Air Missile
CN	Counternarcotics
CS	Combat support
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSS	Combat service support
CTC	Combat Training Center

DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FM	Field Manual
HRO	Humanitarian relief organization
HUMINT	Human intelligence
IDAD	Internal defense and development
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
J3	Joint Staff Current Operations Directorate
J5	Joint Staff Political-Military Directorate
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JP	Joint publication
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LANDSAT	Commercial earth observation satellite
LIC	Low intensity conflict
LNO	Liaison officer
MNF	Multinational Force (in Lebanon)
MOUT	Military operations on urbanized terrain
MP	Military police
MRC	Major regional contingency
NEO	Noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OOTW	Operations other than war
POLAD	Political Advisor/Assistant for International Affairs

PSYOP	Psychological operations
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
ROE	Rules of engagement
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
SF	Special forces
SOF	Special operations forces
STU III	Secure telephone
THAAD	Theater High Altitude Area Defense
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UNITAF	United Task Force (in Somalia)
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

The fact is, that since the end of the Cold War, more U.S. forces have been deployed for longer periods of time away from their home bases than ever occurred during the long face-off with the Soviet Union.¹

FUTURE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN OOTW IS INEVITABLE

U.S. military involvement in future operations other than war (OOTW) is inevitable, whether or not peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance remain fashionable missions. OOTW have been conducted throughout the history of the U.S. military, first within the continental United States, and then outside U.S. borders. Even after failed or controversial operations—such as the nineteen-year nation-building effort in Haiti, efforts during the early years of the Vietnam War, peacekeeping in Beirut as part of Multinational Force 2, the disastrous Desert One operation, support for the Contras in Nicaragua, training the Salvadoran military, and more recently, the peace enforcement operation in Somalia—civilian decisionmakers repeatedly turn to the U.S. military to create solutions for international crises or dilemmas that economic sanctions and diplomacy have proved unable to resolve. Simply put, because no other U.S. agency is comparably equipped, manned, managed, or funded, the U.S. military must be prepared for these missions.

¹James Blackwell, "The Military Option Is Fraught with Risks," *Los Angeles Times*, July 17, 1994, pp. M1, M3.

Now, in the post-Cold War world, U.S. global security strategy is changing and U.S. strategic interests are being defined more broadly than ever, to include not only the desire to foster democracy, but to secure "peace," human rights, and relief from suffering. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has demonstrated greater willingness than in the past to use its military to conduct operations other than conventional battlefield warfare. U.S. military forces have frequently been deployed to conduct such formerly uncommon missions as humanitarian and disaster relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and refugee control operations. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), internal defense and development (IDAD), and security assistance also continue.²

Internal pressure to conduct such varied OOTW is matched by external demands for the United States, as the last remaining superpower, to intervene worldwide as states deteriorate and reconfigure themselves throughout Africa, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean. The United States is a logical choice for several reasons: because the United Nations' infrastructure and funding are not yet adequate to the task of mounting a large operation without significant U.S. support, because countries may be reluctant to turn to regional organizations for assistance if such organizations are dominated by local hegemony with their own agendas, and because the U.S. military is better able to project its force quickly and for longer periods than any other military in the world.³

All these factors explain the United States' recent heavy involvement in OOTW, including: counternarcotics operations in Mexico and Colombia; controlling refugee flows from Haiti and an operation in that country to return it to the democratically elected government; peacekeeping forces in Macedonia now and possibly in Bosnia later should a peace accord be reached there; the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq and later provision of security and assistance to the Kurds;

²Counterinsurgency, the kind of OOTW in which the United States became involved most frequently during the Cold War (both in Vietnam and more recently in Latin America) is less likely to draw U.S. involvement today.

³Of course, timely projection of force and duration of involvement depend both on military capabilities and on political will. U.S. involvement can be delayed by protracted congressional debate or cut short by public pressure.

consideration of U.S. participation in a multinational peacekeeping force in the Golan if Israel and Syria come to terms; conduct of humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement in Somalia; involvement in the United Nations efforts to support elections in Cambodia; and disaster relief following 1991's Cyclone Marian in Bangladesh.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF OOTW

These kinds of operations are relatively unfamiliar to the current U.S. military, given the legacy of a pervasive Cold War focus on the Soviet threat. But even if it had been conducting the gamut of OOTW during the Cold War, the U.S. military would now be facing new challenges in that domain. Indeed, the practical requirements of such operations are changing fundamentally with the combination of converging demographic trends, evolving U.S. strategic goals, and the reconfiguration of the U.S. military.

First, in the developing world, population growth, urbanization, and migration are intersecting to create entire new cities and megalopolises. Between 1990 and 2025 the population in the world's least-developed countries will increase by 143 percent.⁴ In these same countries over the same period, the urban populations will increase at twice that rate. Moreover, these countries have nearly two times the number of displaced people that wealthy countries have.⁵ These demographic trends suggest not only an increase in instability, as the world's poorest countries find their resources stretched beyond their capacities and become unable to care for their populations, but they also suggest that any conflict that does take place in these countries is more likely to occur in densely populated urbanized areas.⁶ In addition, combatants in these regions are as likely to

⁴Michael T. Childress, Paul A. McCarthy, *The Implications for the U.S. Army of Demographic Patterns in the Less Developed World: A Documented Briefing*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-256-A, 1994.

⁵Ibid. The majority of displaced people (whether displaced internally or internationally) have been displaced by conflict. See also the annual publication *World Refugee Survey*, published by the U.S. Committee for Refugees; "Flash Points Update," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 2, 1993, pp. 12-19; and "Flash Points: Confusion, Chaos, and Conflict," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 11, 1992, pp. 53-58.

⁶Jennifer Morrison Taw, Bruce Hoffman, *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-398-A, 1994.

be irregulars as trained soldiers, and both may flout international agreements regarding the conduct of war.

Second, in most OOTW, the objective of applying military force will not be to gain territory or to defeat an enemy per se, but to achieve more subtle or specific political objectives. In such operations, military tactics, techniques, and procedures will be driven more by political requirements than by traditional military rationales and logic. A key political consideration in many cases will be the need to remain neutral. In Somalia, for example, U.S. forces operated under extremely restrictive rules of engagement, despite force protection concerns and attacks by Somali militiamen against U.S. soldiers. Opening humanitarian relief corridors in that country could have been achieved more simply by the application of greater force, but concerns about civilian casualties and a desire to remain neutral in the Somali conflict made such an approach untenable.

Another concern affecting military operations is the fragile political and physical infrastructures soldiers are likely to encounter in many countries. Military operations conducted on such "fragile battlefields" will have a greater humanitarian component and stricter rules of engagement to prevent collateral damage, and they will be very closely guided by political considerations. In the purely disaster relief operation in Bangladesh in 1991, for example, the military operation was shaped in part by the need to reinforce the country's young government and ensure that it took the lead in all efforts. At the other end of the operational continuum, Operation Just Cause in Panama was also influenced by concerns about alienating the local civilian population and by the desire to install a stable government. Soldiers were therefore instructed to hold civilian casualties and infrastructure damage to a minimum, even though the operation itself was a traditional *coup de main*.

Finally, the U.S. military itself is changing radically. It is shrinking, shifting from forward- to CONUS-deployment, and reconfiguring itself. Questions of appropriate ratios of active/reserve components, light/heavy/SOF forces, and maneuver/fire support remain unresolved. Roles and missions for the various services have not been finalized. The Bottom-Up Review is under consideration. What equipment will be procured and to whom it will be distributed is being debated. In most of these discussions, issues relevant to

OOTW are only just beginning to be raised. In the original Bottom-Up Review, for example, the entire evaluation was based on the question of two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs), with the assumption that any forces involved in an OOTW could be rapidly redeployed to participate in the larger conflict.⁷ Similar conventional considerations have been the norm regarding equipping, force structure, and roles and missions.⁸

This monograph examines U.S. participation in recent operations other than war in order to draw lessons relevant to similar operations in the future. By focusing on a series of case studies conducted in the second phase of this project, this monograph (representing the project's third and final phase) will examine some of the key issues relevant to OOTW and preparation for OOTW, describe nuts-and-bolts OOTW requirements, and offer specific, practical recommendations for addressing those issues and requirements.

The monograph is divided into five chapters. Chapter Two describes some of the characteristics common to most OOTW and broadly assesses their various implications. Chapter Three identifies some of the key factors influencing success or failure in OOTW, including political-military communication and the problems of mission swing and mission creep. It concludes with a series of recommendations about how these problems can be effectively anticipated and managed when conducting OOTW. Chapter Four inventories OOTW requirements with particular relevance to U.S. Army doctrine, training, equipment, and force structure, and it offers specific recommendations for addressing those requirements. Chapter Five suggests some ways to distinguish between and categorize operations to facilitate planning for future OOTW.

⁷"Clinton Certifies Army's Ability to Handle Two MRCs, Peace Operation," *Inside the Army*, June 6, 1994, p. 3.

⁸*Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 10, 1993.

**DERIVATION OF COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
AMONG OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

In the second phase of this project, we examined a number of case studies of U.S. operations other than war over the past decade. They were: the U.S. involvement in Multinational Forces 1 and 2 (MNF 1 and MNF 2) in Beirut between 1982 and 1984; Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989; Operation Sea Angel, the disaster relief effort in Bangladesh in 1991; Operation Provide Comfort, which began in 1991 to provide assistance to the Kurds in Northern Iraq; the liberation of Kuwait City during Operation Desert Storm (as an example of military operations on urban terrain, or MOUT, conducted during conventional warfare); and, in Somalia, the U.S. role in both the United Task Force (UNITAF) and in the second UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. We also looked at UN peacekeeping operations in the Sinai in 1956 and 1973 and in Cyprus (ongoing since 1974) to examine the kinds of pure peacekeeping operations in which the United States has little experience.

In a comparative examination of the case studies, we found a number of similar characteristics (Table 1). Each case, for example, was more overshadowed by political considerations than are traditional combat operations. Even in Panama and Kuwait City, concerns about preserving infrastructure and fostering a political atmosphere conducive to the rapid establishment of indigenous political control following combat operations guided the military operations themselves. In Panama, troops were instructed to keep infrastructure damage to a minimum and to avoid civilian casualties to an extent greater than in more typical or straightforward combat operations. This frequently required troops to deliberately put themselves in

Table 1
OOTW Characteristics

Cases	Political Constraints	Restrictive Rules of Engagement	Urban Operations	Nongovernmental Organizations	Humanitarian Component	Coalition	Special Operations Forces
U.S. operations							
Lebanon, 1982-1984	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Panama, 1989	x	x	x	x	x		x
Bangladesh, 1991	x			x	x	x	x
Kurdistan, 1991	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Kuwait, 1991	x		x	x	x	x	x
Somalia, 1992-1994	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
UN operations							
Sinai, 1956-1973	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Cyprus, 1954-present	x	x	x		x	x	

more danger than would have been the case in other kinds of operations.

For example, in traditional urban operations, building “take-downs” and room clearing usually involve throwing grenades into rooms and spraying them with automatic weapons fire before entering; in order to avoid civilian casualties, soldiers in Panama City were required to knock on doors first, then announce their presence, thus making themselves vulnerable. In the liberation of Kuwait City, Arab forces were deliberately chosen to enter Kuwait City first, to demonstrate to the local populace that Arab soldiers were equal, if not lead, agents in the coalition campaign.

Closely related to these omnipresent political considerations is the requirement in almost every operation (excepting the pure disaster relief operation in Bangladesh and the pure combat operation in Kuwait City) for restrictive rules of engagement, that is, rules of engagement that inhibited soldiers from conducting operations as they would under normal combat circumstances. The level of restriction varied: in Panama, the rules were relatively more flexible than in either Lebanon or Somalia, where, at various stages of each operation, extremely restrictive, somewhat confusing, ultimately frustrating—and in Lebanon, dangerous—rules were imposed on soldiers conducting these operations. It is clear, however, that most OOTW will involve restrictive rules of engagement, and that soldiers must be prepared through both doctrine and training to work within such constraints. Moreover, military leaders must ensure that restrictive rules of engagement are made absolutely clear and fully disseminated, so that soldiers are clearly and fully aware how these restrictions affect their capabilities¹—particularly their rights and responsibilities to defend themselves and, where appropriate, the integrity of the operation itself.²

¹Lest one think that soldier knowledge of rules of engagement is a patently obvious consideration, U.S. forces in both Lebanon and Somalia were not clearly apprised of these restrictions, with the effect that in both cases they erred in being more conservative than the ROE actually required.

²Jonathan T. Dworken, *Rules of Engagement for Humanitarian Intervention and Low-Intensity Conflict: Lessons from Restore Hope*, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CRM-993-120, 1993.

Another common characteristic of the case studies, excepting the effort in Bangladesh, is that they involved urban operations. Recalling the brief discussion above of world demographic changes, it is clear that urban operations will be difficult to avoid in future military efforts, be they conventional combat or operations other than war.³ This, of course, has implications for force structure, force ratio, and equipment, among other things, given the manpower-intensive nature of urban operations and the specific requirements for force protection and force presence in cities.

Of all the operations studied in the course of this project, only Operation Just Cause and the liberation of Kuwait City did not involve cooperation—or at least some coordination—with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the course of the operation. Even in Panama, the Red Cross was present at the time of the operation and quickly became involved in postcombat operations, including assisting the U.S. military in setting up and monitoring refugee and prisoner-of-war camps. Indeed, in many of the operations examined, the NGOs were crucial participants and allowed U.S. forces to effectively and rapidly conclude military operations. In Bangladesh and northern Iraq, for example, the NGOs not only provided valuable information about, and liaison with, the local population, but they assumed responsibilities (such as medical attention and food distribution) that would otherwise have required continued U.S. military efforts. NGO-military cooperation was more problematic, however, where U.S. military efforts were perceived as potentially threatening to NGO operations or where NGOs feared that association with U.S. forces could endanger their own personnel. For example, many NGOs were unwilling to be associated with the U.S. military presence in Somalia, for fear that it would threaten their often hard-won relationships with the Somalis. Such antagonism complicated U.S. operations as American units were deprived of both a potentially lucrative source of information about the local population as well as cooperation in food distribution and other humanitarian efforts.

Every case study examined also had a significant humanitarian assistance component. That is, the welfare and safety of the local civilian

³From forthcoming RAND research by James T. Quinlivan on force requirements in stability operations.

population was a serious consideration in the planning and/or execution of the operation. In many cases, this required the military to assume responsibilities for which it has not traditionally been trained or equipped. The provision of food, water, sanitation, medical attention, and some form of housing to the indigenous population characterized each operation—but required equipment and skills beyond the typical capabilities of most U.S. combat forces. This, of course, has serious implications for future OOTW, where planners will have to take into account the manpower, equipment, training, and logistical requirements of caring and providing for local populations.

Of all the operations studied in this project, only Panama was unilateral. The others were coalition efforts, with all the accompanying requirements for sufficient communications capabilities, coordination of effort, development of effective command and control structures, assurance of equipment interoperability or means of working around differences in capabilities, compensation for language differences, and other obstacles. Also, key considerations in coalition operations are the participating countries' underlying—sometimes competing—political objectives and frequently divergent beliefs about the best means of accomplishing the coalition's stated goals.

Finally, all six U.S. operations included high ratios of special operations forces. SOF were represented in relatively large numbers not only by U.S. Army Special Forces, but by civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel. SOF personnel's special skills, training, cultural and language expertise, wide peacetime experience in a variety of combat and noncombat missions, experience in training foreign military and indigenous civilian populations, and often unique, specialized equipment make them ideal for operations other than war, where they can serve as effective force multipliers as well as offer unique skills and capabilities found nowhere else in the armed forces. Effective use of SOF, however, requires sufficient coordination between conventional and SOF forces and commanders, adequate understanding (and appreciation) of SOF skills and capabilities by conventional commanders, and joint training and exercises between SOF and conventional forces.

The similarities between the various cases studied—which were selected, in part, for their apparent dissimilarities so that they would

represent the spectrum of OOTW activities—suggest that such characteristics need to be anticipated in future OOTW.

**KEY FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCCESS OR FAILURE
IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

We have seen the similarities among the selected case studies; however, there are also some crucial differences that can affect whether an operation succeeds or fails in achieving its political and military objectives. When the operations are placed on an operational continuum from “peace” to “war,” it becomes clear that the operations clearly falling at one end or the other were those in which the United States was the most successful. U.S. Army forces are clearly well prepared for the kinds of conventional military operations required in Panama and Kuwait City. Also, although the U.S. military has had far less experience in and deliberate preparation for the kinds of disaster relief and humanitarian operations performed in Bangladesh and Kurdistan, it is clearly able to adapt existing skills and equipment to respond quickly and effectively to the requirements of such situations.¹

Where the United States had more difficulty, however, was in operations that moved back and forth along the continuum between peace and conflict. The two most dramatic cases were Lebanon and Somalia. In each case, problems resulted from the coincidence of dynamic operational environments and unclear or shifting U.S. political objectives.

In Lebanon, U.S. forces involved in Multinational Force 2 (MNF 2) claimed to be conducting peacekeeping alongside the British, French, and Italians. Yet although the British and Italians conducted

¹Similarly, the United Nations effectively performed strict peacekeeping activities in both Cyprus and the Sinai.

relatively straightforward peacekeeping, both the French and the Americans engaged in something more akin to stability operations or foreign internal defense: actively supporting the Christian government and training the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the conflict with the country's various Muslim militias. Thus, while U.S. and French forces were configured for peacekeeping and therefore operated under rules of engagement appropriate for peacekeeping, they were not in fact operating as a neutral force, but had actually become participants in the conflict. This left them in a vulnerable and dangerous position. Indeed, Muslim militias began to target both U.S. and French forces, which had the effect of increasing those forces' support for the LAF. This escalation ultimately resulted in the deadly bombings in October 1983 of the French MNF 2 installation and the U.S. Marine barracks. The bombing broke the will of the MNF participants, and all the MNF forces were withdrawn from Lebanon by March 1984. The entire operation lasted less than 18 months and resulted in the deaths of more than 300 coalition troops. In the end, Lebanon was no more stable than when MNF 2 entered the country in September 1982.

Ten years later, a remarkably similar situation unfolded in Somalia. U.S. forces were initially deployed to conduct strict humanitarian assistance operations (food drops from Kenya) as Operation Provide Relief. When it became clear that the assistance was not reaching the people who most needed it, the United States decided to use military force to ensure the distribution of food to the starving. Thus began Operation Restore Hope. International military support quickly rallied behind the United States, and the American-led United Task Force (UNITAF) was created to provide command and control for the expanding coalition effort. At the outset of UNITAF, the United States agreed only to restore sufficient order to Somalia so that food corridors would remain open and distribution would be assured. Once this objective was achieved, the United States was to hand over control of the operation to the United Nations. UNITAF was successful in large part because of good communication between its leadership and the various Somali leaders and the fact that the actual military mission being performed (i.e., humanitarian assistance) was relatively clear to both the Somalis and the UNITAF forces.

Problems in Somalia began, however, after the handoff from UNITAF to UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II. The UN's political ob-

jectives were far broader than those of UNITAF. They included stability operations, nation building, and disarmament, along with continued humanitarian intervention. Moreover, communication between the UNOSOM II commanders and Somali leaders, particularly Mohammed Farah Aideed, was not maintained. Indeed, where UNITAF had negotiated with Aideed, UNOSOM II tried to marginalize him. With this decision, UNOSOM II's claim to strict neutrality vanished. Moreover, the UN's clear political agenda to reestablish a stable Somali government directly threatened Aideed. As in Lebanon 10 years earlier, foreign military forces deployed for relatively benign operations now became partisans in the conflict and were targeted by rival local militia.

In June 1993, only a month after UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF, Aideed's militia ambushed a Pakistani convoy in Mogadishu. The UNOSOM II command immediately responded by criminalizing Aideed and calling for his capture and that of his closest associates. At this point, the only U.S. forces left in Somalia were support units and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) composed of members of the 10th Mountain Division, a light infantry unit. To capture Aideed, U.S. Rangers and elite special forces were deployed to Somalia. They conducted one successful operation in which a top Aideed aide was captured. On October 3, 1993, however, in the process of conducting another raid, a U.S. helicopter carrying Rangers and elite special forces was shot down. The operation quickly deteriorated from a precision "snatch-and-grab" to intense fighting in the streets and alleyways of Mogadishu. The QRF, with Malaysian and Pakistani support, attempted to extricate the Rangers, but they were attacked by mobs of Somali militiamen and civilians. Eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed. As in Lebanon, the deaths of U.S. soldiers during an effort that had been portrayed as a purely humanitarian operation eroded public and congressional support for continued U.S. involvement. President Clinton consequently suspended the hunt for Aideed and set a firm date for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia. Accordingly, the situation in Somalia today is little better than it was prior to UNITAF. Anarchy and hunger are again evident, remaining UNOSOM forces are unable to accomplish their objectives, and it is clear that with their withdrawal, the situation in the country will eventually revert to what it was before the United States first became involved in Somalia with the air drops of August 1992.

The failure of the Lebanon and Somalia missions can be attributed to the convergence of two factors: unclear or shifting political objectives and dynamic operational environments. In Lebanon, official U.S. policy was to conduct peacekeeping as part of MNF 2. Yet, in truth, the United States intended to support the LAF and the Christian government against their Muslim rivals. U.S. forces and mission planning were therefore unprepared, misinformed, and ill-suited to the task they were ultimately ordered to perform. Similarly, in Somalia, U.S. forces were initially deployed to conduct humanitarian assistance during Operation Provide Relief. Then U.S. Marines stormed the beach to set the stage for limited stability operations intended to open humanitarian relief corridors and establish some stability. Subsequently, U.S. light infantry forces were deployed to conduct the longer-term stability operations. Then, as UNITAF gave way to UNOSOM II, U.S. light infantry forces were pared down and reconfigured to form the Quick Reaction Force for Operation Continue Hope, through which the United States provided support to UNOSOM II. Finally, a small number of U.S. elite combat forces, as part of UNOSOM II, were involved in the hunt for Aideed in an operation unrelated to the QRF or its objectives. U.S. political objectives thus shifted throughout the operation, and as in Lebanon, U.S. forces' missions permuted, leaving them at various times in the operation unsure of their mission, unclear on their rules of engagement, and unprepared for the levels of violence they would encounter. The lack of clear political direction not only affected U.S. forces' capabilities in each case, but also made it difficult for either the citizens or the leadership in Lebanon and Somalia to effectively gauge U.S. intentions.

As mentioned above, this situation was compounded in both cases by dynamic operational environments. In neither Lebanon nor Somalia was the United States able to assess the threat facing its forces effectively or accurately. In neither case were agreements with various indigenous factions established before the deployment of U.S. forces. In both instances the local political and military situations were confusing, changeable, and complex. This fluid situation compounded the difficulty not only of planning for and executing effective military operations, but of anticipating problems and responding accordingly.

These two cases illustrate the difficulties of conducting successful military operations where there are both unclear or shifting political objectives and a dynamic operational environment. Yet it is likely that in most future OOTW the operational environment will be fluid and the political guidance obscure or changeable. How can the U.S. Army best prepare itself for these challenges? The keys lie in effective political-military communications and adequate recognition—and anticipation—of the effects of mission shift and mission swing.

POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

In OOTW, more than any other kind of military operation, the “marriage” of political and military objectives must be extremely close-knit. Whereas the strategies, operational requirements, and tactics of conventional battlefield warfare derive from broadly writ political directives—usually “seize territory” and “defeat the enemy”—the political goals of most operations other than war must infuse military decisionmaking at the most picayune levels of detail. In Operation Just Cause (OJC), for example, which was a relatively straightforward *coup de main* applying the most basic tenets of U.S. military doctrine—attrition of the enemy and destruction of his will through the application of massive firepower and overwhelming force—soldiers were required to avoid civilian casualties and preserve, as much as possible, physical infrastructure (including national monuments that had been previously identified). These directives derived not only from calculations of the most expedient military approach for defeating the Panama Defense Forces and capturing Manuel Noriega, but also from political objectives. For OJC, the political goals required not only seizure of territory and defeat of an enemy, but the preservation of vital physical infrastructure, the creation of a political atmosphere conducive to stabilizing the country after the invasion, reinstatement of the Endara government, and the setup of a new civilian police force.

Thus, while military missions have always been derived from political objectives, it is likely that in OOTW, multifaceted political goals will complicate the development of clear military missions to a degree not previously encountered in more traditional combat operations. And, as in Panama, although OOTW may require some conventional military planning and missions, other tasks—not usually

associated with conventional military operations—will nonetheless inevitably fall to soldiers. Local opinion must be shaped and the public's support obtained through refugee control, civil affairs, psychological operations, and, frequently, restraint on the part of combat soldiers who—in clear contrast to most U.S. military training and doctrine—may have to put themselves in increased danger to avoid accidental civilian casualties. Military personnel may also have to work directly with other militaries, local civilians, and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Moreover, humanitarian concerns—provision of housing, food, water, and medical care to the local population—are likely to be part of any future OOTW. Thus, political considerations will exert a stronger influence than before on how the military operation is conducted.

This requirement for a “marriage” of the political and military has long been understood by those familiar with counterinsurgency. The most successful counterinsurgencies (Britain's “small wars” in Malaya and Kenya) achieved this integration by having a single leader (Sir Gerald Templer in Malaya and Sir George Erskine—later General Sir Gerald Lathbury—in Kenya) preside over an orchestrated policymaking, police, and military effort in which each tactic and technique applied by the military was part of a larger, carefully considered plan.² One of the key advantages of this pyramid system of command and control is that it facilitates close communication between the military and civilian leaders at all levels, with a single decisionmaker ensuring that all operations are guided by a coherent plan of action.

In U.S. operations, this assignment of political and military control to a single individual in the theater of operations is impossible.³ Because mutual understanding and consensus must be reached without resorting to a single individual making all the decisions uni-

²See Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, and Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, N-3506-DOS, 1992. Of course, appointment of a single leader does not guarantee success. The British discovered this in Cyprus, where, despite the appointment of Field Marshal Sir John Harding as governor, the counterinsurgency campaign was much less successful.

³Perhaps the closest the United States has come to this were General Eisenhower's and General MacArthur's roles following World War II and MacArthur's and General Ridgway's experiences in Korea.

laterally, the importance of close communication and coordination between the military and political leaderships is paramount.

The U.S. operations in which rhetoric or unclear political objectives drove the development of military strategies were the least successful. The case studies suggest a number of lessons about high-level communications:

Communication from the Policy Level to the Military

- 1. Only when equipped with a fairly unambiguous sense of the political objectives and the expected end state can military planners craft the necessary military objectives and plans for the undertaking at hand.**

The military must elicit a clear understanding of the political leadership's desired end state—e.g., the conditions that should obtain at the conclusion of the operation. To this end, CINCs and service chiefs should make full use of their political advisors (POLADs) during this process, prompting other interagency actors to state their objectives and preferred outcomes clearly so that military planning can be conducted on the basis of political guidance.

- 2. Future operations would benefit from greater involvement of the service chiefs from the earliest deliberations at the governmental policy level.**

Service chiefs should be included in more of the planning and early discussions with the political leadership. Since Goldwater-Nichols, the service chiefs have become more the logisticians and sustainers of military operations and less involved in their planning. But if the political and military objectives of an operation require access to reserve component assets or to resources not assigned to a CINC—experts from a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) school or Army laboratory, for example—service chiefs' involvement could prove necessary and invaluable.

- 3. Disjunctures between changing policy and static military missions can lead to the conduct of military operations that can endanger—and potentially undermine—political efforts.**

Policymakers must be able to quickly communicate to the military policy changes and new instructions. Where possible, the military should be consulted in advance of policy changes to give them time to implement changes in plans and operations. Otherwise, command and control arrangements must be constructed in such a way that word of policy changes reaches all affected military elements, including covert operations units, on a timely basis.⁴

Communication from the Military to the Policy Level

1. Additional political guidance may be required as operations transition from phase to phase.

The military must adequately explain to the policymakers the phasing of prospective operations, the expectation of how they might unfold, and what casualties might be expected. Military planners must not only detail the preferred sequence of events, but also identify for political leaders those points at which they may be called upon to render additional political guidance.

2. Political preference to keep OOTW deployments to the minimum essential size will limit the flexibility of the operation.

The military must explain to political decisionmakers the consequences of keeping OOTW deployments to the minimum essential size: specifically, by limiting the skills and capabilities available, this may inhibit the deployed force's ability to adapt to changing political objectives and/or the evolving operational environment. Such a requirement also runs counter to the nature of most OOTW, where a deployed force may have to include special operations forces, engineers, military police, or other combat support or combat service support forces in higher ratios than normally deploy with combat units, and where force protection issues may require a mix of light and heavy forces.

⁴For example, according to press coverage of President Clinton's commiseration with the parents of the slain Rangers following the events of October 3, 1994 in Somalia, the President could not understand why the operation took place, since it was his understanding that the policy toward Aideed had already been changed. See "Two Killed in Somalia Are to Get Medal of Honor," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1994, p. 29.

3. Activation of the reserves can be slow and may also signal a greater commitment on the part of the United States.

The military must offer realistic assessments of manpower and force structure requirements to policymakers, and they, in turn, must be made to understand the ramifications of delaying activation of the reserve component. Alternatives include empowering the Department of Defense to activate a limited number of reserves, a possibility currently under discussion.⁵

4. Domestic political constraints on the size of an operation can jeopardize the overall mission and achievement of the political objective.

Commanders must communicate to policymakers the importance of deploying essential capabilities, especially for force protection, and must stress that the force package deployed is a part of the strategy for the overall operation. Thus, it may be better to have untapped, residual military capabilities present in a theater than to be in a position of either having to reinforce the mission once it is underway—thus giving the impression that the United States is somehow enlarging its commitment—or forgoing what may be essential capabilities later on. Dialogue on both manpower requirements and minimum capabilities must be carried out with a full appreciation of how rapidly circumstances can shift in OOTW and how urgently military capabilities may become desirable or essential.

5. Political decisionmakers rely on military leaders' appraisals of a military operation's progress; concomitantly, political leaders are in a better position to assess the implications of such progress for the achievement of the broader political goals.

Military leaders must communicate their appraisals of changes in the threat or in the operational environment to political leaders, realizing that even militarily insignificant changes can, under some circumstances, have political import. Methodical, routine debriefings should be required for all patrols and other military

⁵Mark Kinkade, "Bill Seeks to Ease Reserve Call-Ups: Secretary Could Activate 25,000 to Fill Gaps," *European Stars and Stripes*, July 29, 1994, p. 3.

activities that might be used to ascertain subtle changes in the operational area; military officials, in turn, must share their assessments with the policy leadership on a regular basis.

MISSION CREEP/MISSION SWING

Political-military communication is even more critical as operational environments shift rapidly and political goals are either achieved or transformed. In such cases, an immediate political determination is required on how best to proceed or whether to proceed at all.

Operations other than war do not, like more traditional military missions, move either linearly or in a predictable fashion from one set of tasks and objectives to another. In OOTW, military activities may career from peacekeeping to coercive measures and back to cooperative actions. Such rapid shifts can be caused by two very different, but often interactive, phenomena: *mission creep* and *mission swing*. In mission creep, new or shifting political guidance requires military operations different from what the intervening force initially planned (as in Lebanon during the deployment of Multinational Force 2, for example, where U.S. forces were nominally sent—and were therefore configured—to conduct peacekeeping, but were actually conducting something more like foreign internal defense or stability operations). In mission swing, the mission changes in response to a quick deterioration or improvement of the operational environment that occurs irrespective of the intervening force's presence or efforts (as in the Congo in 1961 and Cyprus in 1974, where the conflicts in each country escalated despite the presence of UN peacekeepers).

Each of these two phenomena can require rapid decisions on whether the intervening military forces should—depending on the circumstances—desist from their planned activities, adjust those activities, or conduct completely new activities. Such a decision must involve both policymakers and military leaders, to ensure that it reflects not only the most current political objectives and appraisal of the situation, but also the military commanders' assessments of the

practical requirements generated by the changing circumstances and their capabilities for responding.⁶

Even before an OOTW begins, however, military commanders must anticipate abrupt changes in mission and/or rapid deterioration of the political-military circumstances in which the mission is performed, and task organize appropriately.

Mission Creep

Mission creep is likely when military operations are guided by (1) unclear political objectives or strategy, (2) political objectives focused on resolving only the symptom of a much broader problem or (3) policy directives intended to obscure less-palatable political objectives. Army planners should recognize that mission creep can be prompted by both international and domestic policy actions.

At the international level, security organizations, including the United Nations, Organization of American States, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization for African Unity, and others may create unpredictability through their need to build consensus for action at various points in the operation. Moreover, nations may donate troops to an operation without fully relinquishing control over when and how they will be deployed. Coalition commanders may have to make last-minute changes in operations to accommodate nations' determinations about how their forces may be used. States involved in the coalition—including the United States—may have to adjust their political objectives in response to what is possible within the constraints of the coalition, and their forces' missions may have to change to accommodate the positions of allied states.

⁶The Army must be cautious to recommend expansion or escalation of the effort only on the basis of professional military judgment, underwritten by sound, objective analysis, and to avoid the possible temptation to allow the mission to move in the direction of the preferred, full-dimensional operations in order to extricate the Army from the less-familiar ground of OOTW.

The dynamics of U.S. policy can also produce mission creep as the national leadership responds to domestic and international pressures. Often, issues produce great time sensitivity within an administration, causing the policymakers to demand quick results. If the current level of military activity does not produce the desired outcome quickly, there may be a temptation to withdraw or to expand the mission and add more military assets. Domestic pressures can produce similar responses. There may be widespread public (or media) pressure to "get this thing over with," or other such sentiments surrounding an operation. The administration may feel resulting pressure to do something decisive.

The Army faces multiple challenges in dealing with mission creep:

1. **The danger of mission creep has been etched into the minds of Army officers as one of the lessons from the Vietnam experience.** Officers receive admonishments throughout their careers against mission creep—specifically, that an operation may expand out of proportion to its political-military importance or that the mission may gradually mutate from something with militarily attainable objectives into an impossible task. *Nonetheless, commanders must not forgo opportunities to exploit newly discovered enemy weaknesses out of fear that they are engaging in mission creep.*⁷

The Army must learn to identify mission creep separately from opportunities that legitimately deserve military exploitation.

2. **The Army must communicate its capabilities clearly and consistently to policymakers.**

Although the Army Staff has less direct involvement in such decisions since implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), his operations deputy, Trusted Agents, and action officers can nevertheless play a significant indirect role. The CSA, in addition to his interaction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, can use his POLAD to ensure that the Army assessment

⁷John E. Peters observed this tendency within the Army strategy team (of which he was a member) during the Gulf War. Members of the team fixated on the original objectives of the campaign to such a degree that they failed to consider possible opportunities for exploitation and pursuit as the Iraqi army collapsed.

and recommendation is known elsewhere within the interagency process, especially at the Department of State. Legislative liaison could brief the Army position to key congressional committees. The operations deputy and his deputies could advance the Army position with J3 and J5, while the Trusted Agents and action officers coordinate and explain the Army recommendation to the Joint Staff at large. There is an obvious danger that such an activist approach might be perceived as political. Nevertheless, since the Army is the nation's only source of sustained, strategic land combat power, its assessment of a situation in which the national leadership contemplates a wider military role is crucial.

3. **While military leaders must do all in their power to communicate effectively with policymakers, they must also realize that, under some circumstances, political expediency may require policymakers to obscure their true political objectives.**

While the rhetoric policymakers turn to in such cases may facilitate the long-term achievement of political goals, military planning cannot be based upon it. Thus, military commanders must build flexibility into the forces deploying for OOTW, to allow for quick adjustment to shifting requirements. Commanders may encounter some resistance in requesting capabilities that do not seem warranted given the mission at hand, but senior political leaders should be reminded that it may be more prudent to deploy initially what appear to be excessive military capabilities rather than send them later when the shipment may raise concerns about escalation in the face of a deteriorating situation.

Mission Swing

Mission swing, in contrast to mission creep, occurs *despite* the actions of the intervening country. Under such circumstances, events completely beyond the control of the intervening country's civilian or military leadership can affect the requirements of an operation. Indeed, the intervening country's military force must respond to the enemy, exploit opportunities, adapt to new force protection requirements, and adjust to enemy countermeasures, among other things. In such cases, mission swing is a purely military consideration. Other factors, however, such as the appearance (and demands)

of other actors—NGOs, new factions, international security organs⁸—can also induce mission swing, as can major environmental changes such as floods, famines, and other disasters.

In OOTW, more than in conventional battlefield warfare, the operational environment is prone to such rapid changes and requires equally rapid responses. The kinds of flexibility and versatility required for responding to mission creep also apply to mission swing. Below are some recommendations that can help mitigate the potentially dangerous effects of mission swing on U.S. Army operations:

1. Commanders must build a fungible and adaptive force package so that they can adjust rapidly should mission swing occur.

The core unit in *most* cases should be a major combat formation, with a reservoir of untapped military potential. The unit's habitually associated attachments, if not included in the current force package, should be standing by in a state of readiness that would enable them to augment the core unit on short notice. "Just-in-time" training support packages should be prepared in the event that the troops must be prepared for new, unfamiliar tasks. Likewise, special-purpose support packages should be poised for deployment, providing police equipment, environmental monitoring gear, and similar highly specialized capabilities, should the need for them arise.

2. Troop-leading practices are crucial to improving flexibility and should be emphasized in preparation for OOTW.

Soldiers must be thoroughly briefed to ensure that they understand how the situation, rules of engagement, mission, and other particulars are changing. Soldiers must have concrete guidance on how their conduct should change to fit the new circumstances. Small-unit leaders must ensure that soldiers change their mindsets appropriately as well; otherwise their behavior may not be

⁸For example, U.S. forces might be securing a limited airhead line around an airfield when they discover that a relief agency medical dispensary outside the perimeter also requires security. If the situation deteriorates further, the U.S. forces might find themselves launching a relief column to extract the medical workers from hostile territory. In the process, the mission would have swung—if only temporarily—from airfield security to noncombatant evacuation, with some potential for a serious firefight.

congruent with the more restrictive or permissive circumstances in which they must operate.

3. **Units will need a certain amount of time to prepare for their new role as mission creep occurs.**

Units may need rehearsals for new types of operations. For example, early in the Vietnam experience, U.S. infantry divisions defended strategic enclaves. As the shift to offensive operations occurred, these units required no special augmentation but did need time to train for airmobile operations and sharpen their small-unit tactics.

4. **Good intelligence is essential and should also be emphasized in an operation's early planning stages.**

Whatever human intelligence (HUMINT) that can be collected from NGOs, local civilians, and patrol debriefings will be valuable in anticipating mission swing. The chain of command must be aggressive in collecting and passing information about the local situation so that commanders can gauge relative stasis and change. In the absence of complete confidence that they understand and can predict local dynamics, commanders will have to exercise increased caution in conducting their operations.

**OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:
REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

In the previous chapter we have discussed the broad requirements for political-military communication and anticipation of mission creep or mission swing in operations other than war. Here we identify more specific requirements pertaining to force structure, equipment, training, and doctrine.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The longstanding Army practice of task organizing for a specific mission or operation will support preparations for OOTW as well. What distinguishes the task organization process for OOTW from its more familiar applications are the size and types of units that may be used to augment basic capabilities and the key determinants of augmentation requirements.

Since in many OOTW the use of force is not central to the mission, commanders preparing operational plans must consider what capabilities besides combat power might help them. For example, operations planned for places where the population is ambivalent to a U.S. presence may benefit from psychological operations units accompanying the force to explain the U.S. effort and build public support for it. When the mission requires assistance with regard to limited or failing public infrastructure and services, civil affairs units may be appropriate. Missions including disaster relief or humanitarian assistance might include medical support and engineer units capable of vertical construction. Some of these capabilities come from

echelons above corps and some from the reserve components: important considerations to bear in mind.

Since task organizing for OOTW includes some considerations that are major departures from task organizing for combat operations, we survey some of them here to assist in tailoring forces for the requirements in OOTW.

Nontraditional Task Organization

1. Many operations other than war may demand skills and capabilities not found in mainstream maneuver formations.

The appropriate building block for a task force may be a non-maneuver unit such as an engineer brigade. Alternatively, a large combat unit may require augmentation with appropriate capabilities, such as civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), special forces (SF), or engineer attachments.

2. More than one specialized skill or additional resources may be required.

The base unit needs to be able to handle multiple attachments and should have adequate staff to coordinate and control their activities. Headquarters augmentation with more staff and communications may be prudent under some circumstances.

3. Specialized skills and resources may reside outside the military.

Interagency cooperation is at a premium, and details from other executive branch agencies could also contribute important skills. For example, NASA and the Environmental Protection Agency might provide essential capabilities during an environmental damage survey operation. Other agencies with which the U.S. Army may cooperate include the CIA, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), State Department, Justice Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and a variety of NGOs, including the Red Cross.

4. Mission swing may require immediate access to capabilities apparently unnecessary at the outset of the operation.

The Army must deploy what may be necessary in addition to what is immediately necessary. For example, at the outset of an operation, a task force based on a maneuver unit may not need to deploy that unit's habitually associated field artillery and air defense units. Nevertheless, before deciding to leave these or similar resources at home, the unit commander must anticipate possible mission swing. Indeed, it may be more prudent to deploy initially what appear to be excessive capabilities than to send them later when the shipment may raise concerns about escalation in the face of a deteriorating situation. One means of minimizing local political fallout from deploying apparently inappropriate materiel would be to base such capabilities offshore. Secondly, push packages should be made accessible. Finally, the requirements-based task organization process should be modified to provide additional capability.

5. Traditional "tooth-to-tail" ratios may be inadequate because of inherent OOTW requirements, austere environments, and coalition demands.

OOTW may require more combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) than a normal division has. The case studies reviewed for this effort all suggest that additional CS and CSS beyond the normal division or corps "slice" are desirable. Austere conditions in the theater of operations may mean that no local support is available. In addition, as the Somalia case demonstrated, demanding operating conditions and weather may further stress combat support and service support requirements when parts failures exceed predicted failure rates and when preventive maintenance must be performed more frequently.

Other sources of stress on the combat support and service support resources of U.S. forces include coalition and alliance partners that depend on U.S. logistics capabilities for their own sustainment. Commanders should bear these factors in mind when assessing their combat support and combat service support needs. The case studies suggest that 100 percent increases in prescribed load list items are appropriate for the most demanding theaters.

6. Pressure for a minimum essential force package may exist.

Greater emphasis must be placed on technology to harness resources outside the theater and on unit cross-training in necessary skills. Although the desire for a minimum essential force package may be legitimate (based upon host nation sensitivities or domestic considerations, among other things), such instructions may constrain what a task force is able to deploy. Yet this is in direct opposition to the requirements of many operations other than war, where mission swing and nontraditional missions may demand rapid access to unusual resources and skills. Commanders should therefore anticipate that they will not be able to deploy all of the desirable capabilities within their task forces. In order to compensate, they might use technology to sustain access to resources that they cannot deploy with them into the theater of operations. Teleconferencing equipment could secure communications with regional experts, PSYOP advisors, and medical and other specialists. STU III telephones could be used to create a secure e-mail computer link to reach out-of-theater intelligence resources and other sensitive assets.

Also, units should cross-train in critical skills in anticipation of these constraints. Depending on the requirements of the mission, engineer units might refresh their secondary skills as infantry. Infantry might practice crowd and traffic control in anticipation of a dearth of military police or mine detection and obstacle clearance in the absence of engineers.

7. Because high-quality arms from the global export market, hybrid weapon systems that fuse Eastern and Western technologies for deadly results, and off-the-shelf communications equipment can combine to provide some developing world forces with new levels of lethality, force protection is critical even in nonoffensive OOTW. Weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them also potentially confront U.S. forces in the near term, making unique demands and raising the stakes of force protection failure.

Commanders should anticipate that extraordinary measures may be necessary to safeguard U.S. troops. In uncertain environments, it may be necessary to deploy accompanying air defenses,

AEGIS, Corpsam, and THAAD to create successive umbrellas—concentric arcs of protection—against aircraft and missile-delivered threats. Pretreatment and vaccination against chemical and biological agents, respectively, may be prudent. Nuclear, chemical, and biological monitoring and response teams may also be necessary—especially for operations that include policing of battlefields where chemical or other weapons may have been employed. Although these may seem to be normal activities when preparing for a major regional contingency, it is important that Army planners give them due consideration when organizing for OOTW.

Depending upon the threat assessment, some mix of armor may be necessary. And the growing likelihood that OOTW will take place in urban areas also creates requirements. Task forces will need improved intelligence, surveillance, and monitoring capabilities to scan buildings and infrastructure that may offer an adversary an unexpected avenue of attack.

Nor will U.S. forces have automatic recourse to high levels of violence to protect themselves. Restrictive rules of engagement may limit the means with which a force responds to an attack against it. Commanders might consider the use of reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target-acquisition capabilities to locate and neutralize threats before they can coalesce for action against U.S. troops. This mode of operations should pose few problems for Army troops, since they have demonstrated the ability to adapt quickly and behave professionally when trained under restrictive rules of engagement.

8. Resources available at echelons above corps may be ideal for specialized task forces and may enhance versatility.

Planners must keep in mind such resources when task organizing. Reaching assets located in echelons above corps should not pose a problem. Yet, while commanders are accustomed to requesting necessary capabilities as they task organize their forces, they must remember to consider these less frequently tapped resources as they do their planning. Moreover, as commanders consider the potential effects of mission creep or mission swing on their forces, senior leaders should seek to create the most versatile force pack-

age possible, so that if the situation deteriorates, they do not have to ask for additional capabilities that have to be approved through the potentially slow policymaking process.

Rotation Base

1. There may be a requirement for specialized, low-density skills (skills that have relatively little representation in the force structure) that exceeds the rotation base for such skills.¹

Some skills (e.g., specialized language and cultural knowledge) should be drawn from civilian rosters (academics, diplomats, etc.) developed especially for such contingencies. Also, emphasis

¹All active component special forces skills reside in approximately 12,000 people. This represents a relatively small reservoir, given the number of capabilities that special forces must sustain. Creating regional expertise is time-consuming. Language training and social acculturation, not to mention training in the soldier's military occupational specialties, can take several years. Since each special forces group (SFG) is oriented toward a specific geographical area, its end-strength represents the bulk of the Army's depth in many critical skills. Although the prospect seems very unlikely, if a special forces contingent on an OOTW were to sustain heavy losses, the effect on the availability of highly specialized expertise could be significant, since no immediate replacements beyond the resources of the specific SFG might be available. Certain special operations aviation capabilities reside in still fewer people and hence are more vulnerable in extended operations.

Civil affairs is principally a reserve component specialty. These experts are often city managers or public utility operators whose expertise arises from their civilian professions. The four companies of the 96th Civil Affairs represent the only active component civil affairs resources. Sustained operations or multiple, sequential missions could conceivably outstrip active component resources in short order. At the same time, since these are skills readily found in the civil community, commanders may find contracting with commercial firms for certain services a practical alternative to activating reserve component civil affairs units. In other instances, civil affairs-like skills may be found in engineer units. Nevertheless, current active component civil affairs resources are few, and long-term OOTW that make heavy demands on them will likely cause commanders to begin improvising with engineers or contractual services to satisfy mission requirements.

Psychological operations units, unlike civil affairs, seem to have achieved a balance of active and reserve component resources adequate to meet OOTW requirements. The five active component PSYOP battalions provide a sound rotation base for the types of OOTW encountered in the case studies. In the future, they may be able to make use of teleconferencing and other information warfare technology to reduce their presence in theater and still provide responsive, professional support to the task force. In any case, psychological operations units do not pose a rotation base problem for the OOTW contemplated in this report.

should be placed on the development of information warfare technology that obviates the need for a rotation base of some specialties.

2. Many specialized capabilities reside primarily in the reserve component.²

In the absence of a presidential call-up, some contracting with civilian specialists may be necessary. Also, some reserve units' primary skills may be found as secondary skills in other units, and those units should be identified and prepared prior to operations. Additionally, pressure should be maintained to allow call-ups of limited numbers of reserve forces (as is currently under discussion) without presidential authority. Finally, rotation schedules for volunteer reservists, Individual Ready Reservists, and the Ready Reserve need to be reconsidered to allow for greater continuity in long-term operations.³

3. Urban operations—such as building-clearing and crowd and riot control—will probably have to be conducted using minimum force. Such operations demand high numbers of personnel and can eat into the rotation base.

²Present legislation makes no provision to retain members of the Ready Reserve or the IRR on active duty for more than 24 months. OOTW or a series of operations that required long-term commitment of reserve component units and individuals might therefore require modification of Section 673, Title 10, United States Code.

³Rapid access to reserve component resources is contingent upon several factors: an executive order directing call-up of selected units and personnel, and the ability to attract volunteers. During Operation Desert Shield, for example, some 10,500 volunteers were employed by the military before President Bush signed Executive Order 12727. Most of the initial volunteers operated port facilities and back-filled CONUS-based units as their active component counterparts were deployed. Thus, to benefit fully from reserve component volunteers, an OOTW would need to generate enough enthusiasm to bring them forward and there would have to be a role for them in CONUS (since few would probably volunteer for overseas deployment).

In addition, the timing of a presidential call to active duty is clearly critical. In the case of the Gulf War, 20 days elapsed between the Iraqi invasion and the president's order. Because of the president's possible reluctance to activate portions of the reserve component described earlier, commanders should anticipate that they will not have immediate access to capabilities in the reserve component during the earliest stages of an OOTW. Unless the laws of access to the reserves change, commanders planning operations that require civil affairs and similar capabilities should request the available active component units early in their planning.

Planners must recognize that while urban operations typically require a higher ratio of manpower per square foot than do rural operations, the manpower requirements are then compounded by the need to apply minimum force rather than maximum firepower. As the amount of force it is politically acceptable to use goes down, the number of troops required to contain a situation rises.⁴ If an operation is prolonged, this issue has even greater implications for force structure and rotation. A small operation can thus require a relatively large number of units.

EQUIPPING

There are at least three different factors, in addition to operational requirements and a unit's Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), that might influence the way commanders think about equipping their forces: mission creep and mission swing, morale and welfare, and force protection. The most obvious aspect of equipping a force—for mission accomplishment—generally is done well, insofar as the mission and the operational environment are understood. The problem noted from the case studies is that, frequently, important aspects of the mission are not understood or do not emerge until after deployment. Thus, commanders suddenly find themselves confronted with the unanticipated need to provide water for a civilian population, or find their operational capabilities for search and seizure narrowly constrained by the available helicopter and fire support assets in their force package.

The prospect of mission creep and mission swing, as discussed above, also challenges a commander's anticipatory ability. Senior leaders must ask themselves what additional capabilities might be required or desirable as an operation proceeds. A closely related question is what nonmilitary equipment a task force needs. In general terms, the necessary items are in the inventory, but commanders must be conditioned to plan for all contingencies based upon a thorough understanding of the operational environment and the conditions that may confront the task force, and then to ask for additional

⁴Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, London: Faber, 1981, p. 90.

military capabilities to preclude the need to reinforce a mission later on, when it may be impolitic or impossible to do so.

Force protection ultimately involves equipping troops so that they can operate effectively no matter how innovative the adversary becomes. They must have the ability to perform a given task in different ways. This means providing appropriate nonlethal means when the enemy attacks from behind crowds of women and children, providing deadly force in ways that it can be applied with accuracy and discrimination, and providing the wherewithal to respond effectively if the enemy escalates the level of violence. Additionally, it means providing soldiers with enough capabilities that they are confident in their ability to command any situation that develops, no matter what the rules of engagement and no matter how clever the enemy.

Morale and welfare also play an important role in any operation. Stress may be worse for troops in OOTW than in high-tempo combat operations because they may not have full recourse to the use of force and must exercise more restraint than their foes. Under such circumstances, little things mean a good deal. Interviews with 10th Mountain Division troops who had deployed to Somalia, for example, indicated a perception that Belgian troops were better cared for (and by extension were more appreciated by their leadership) because they were allowed to wear shorts and had a beer ration—this despite the fact that the Belgian bivouac was decidedly more austere than the United States' from an objective point of view. Commanders should be sensitive to these issues and make attempts to accommodate them insofar as discipline and operational considerations allow.

In addition to these general considerations, there are also more specific equipment requirements particular to OOTW. Below we list some of these requirements, and suggestions for responding to them.

Combat, Security, and Crowd Control

1. OOTW may require special equipment not in a unit's TOE.

Unit commanders should not have to rely on their organic equipment and should consider the option of augmenting their

unit's equipment with whatever meets the operational requirements imposed by terrain (including urban), environment, and such constraints as restrictive rules of engagement (ROE).

2. Restrictive ROE could prohibit some forms of fire support.

Units may need to rely on snipers, urban mountaineering capabilities, scanning and sensor equipment, and spotters and radars to locate mortar fire where a counterfire program is impossible.

3. Clearing and securing buildings in urban environments may demand more manpower than is available as well as require specialized equipment to compensate for restrictive ROE.

Emphasis should be placed on devices such as unattended ground sensors that deny—or inform of—entrance to cleared rooms or buildings, flash-bang grenades, night vision equipment, and other nonlethal technologies. A catalogue of such specialized equipment might prove useful to unit commanders.

4. Presence and visibility may be critical in many OOTW.

Light, wheeled, armored vehicles with sideports are at a premium for patrolling and maintaining presence, as are body armor and add-on armor for light utility vehicles.

5. The area of operation in a given OOTW might be vast, and units' organic equipment might not be adequate.

Equipment that compensates for large areas of operation (fixed-wing liaison aircraft, single side band radios, retransmission stations for increasing the range of organic, tactical radios) and additional vehicles may be extremely valuable.

6. Crowd and riot control may be necessary in OOTW.

Police equipment and crowd control aids such as transparent personal body shields, pepper spray, rubber bullets, snipers, truncheons, water cannons, tasers, barricades, and other barrier materials may be useful.

7. Force protection materials are also critical in OOTW.

Barrier materials may be necessary, and unattended ground sensors or nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) equipment could also prove useful. Wide-area air and missile defenses may become essential in some theaters. Where a terrorist threat is high, it may be prudent to base U.S. forces at sea, aboard Navy ships.

Support and Sustainment

1. OOTW are frequently characterized by remote and/or under-developed theaters of operation and demands for sustainment and support by not only U.S. troops but coalition partners and the local population.

Well-digging equipment, water desalinization and purification gear, sanitation equipment, tentage or heavy plastic sheeting, transportation, mortuary equipment, specialized medical equipment, road building or repairing equipment (bulldozers, graders), and mine-clearing equipment might be required.

2. Mission creep or mission swing may require equipment beyond that with which forces deployed.

"Push packages" could be prepared for the eventuality of mission creep or mission swing. Push packages could also assist in support and sustainment when forces must deploy very rapidly and can bring only critical items needed for initial, short-term operations.⁵

TRAINING

The case studies show most of the units involved in OOTW to have been well trained in the basic individual and collective skills essential

⁵Of course, since push packages are prefabricated, it is frequently impossible to change or adjust their contents once a unit determines its exact sustainment requirements. Push packages, though they may arrive promptly, are an inherently inefficient use of the logistics system. Thus, at some point, the sustainment process should transition from push packages back to a routinized system of ordering and receiving the required supplies.

to their primary mission. They were also quick to self-diagnose and address shortfalls that appeared (e.g., crowd control) once they deployed. However, as capability requirements diverged further from unit Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP)-like skills, units found themselves less capable of providing the necessary training.

Units that have the mission to conduct OOTW would benefit from predeployment preparation in a number of skills. Some of these, such as crowd control, driving commercial vehicles, patrolling, and combat lifesaving are well taught within the unit. Other skills, such as negotiator, spokesperson, and liaison may require more formalized instruction. The peacekeeping school at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, is apparently providing some of the necessary individual and collective training. It prepares junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to negotiate prisoner exchanges between factions, to bargain for the return of stolen weapons, and to keep the use of force within established guidelines, among other things. It teaches units how to respond to noncombatants and to irregular and factional forces, how to escort UN officials, and how to screen out infiltrators.

Yet despite such progress in training, shortcomings remain. General Maxwell Thurman, USA (Ret.) has voiced concerns that current development of foreign area officers is inadequate for the demands of "aggravated peace keeping."⁶ The general asserted that the military education system does not prepare officers adequately for such activities or equip them with the in-depth knowledge of other agencies and their capabilities that an officer would need to be able to coordinate the activities of an interagency team.

These and other shortcomings in OOTW are to be expected in a military that emphasizes overwhelming force and enemy attrition as a means of shortening conflict and preventing casualties among its soldiers. Such an approach works effectively on a battlefield or in warfare where the enemy is easily distinguished (and/or separated) from noncombatants. In OOTW, however, where combatants may hide behind crowds of civilians, where sniping and guerrilla raids from within heavily populated urban areas may be the preferred

⁶See *Navy Times*, July 11, 1994.

mode of attack, where infrastructure may already be so fragile that further destruction would be disastrous to the local population, and where collateral damage may threaten political objectives, massive firepower may be more counterproductive than productive. Thus, below are some recommendations for improving education and training for U.S. soldiers in OOTW.

1. **OOTW may require skills not always regularly trained or exercised by combat troops, including negotiating skills, crowd and riot control, and skills needed to help ensure unit self-sufficiency (such as combat lifesaving).**

Predeployment training in such skills as crowd control, driving commercial vehicles, patrolling, and combat lifesaving could be taught within units. Negotiation and liaison skills could be more formally taught in schools. All such skills could be reinforced during exercises at Combat Training Centers (CTCs) such as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the CMTC at Hohenfels, Germany, where peacekeeping exercises are currently being conducted.

2. **OOTW may require familiarization with culture, terrain, and territory about which the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) and the national intelligence agencies have little data.**

Academics knowledgeable about a given region or country should be retained to brief deploying units about cultural norms and terrain. For such purposes, a list of regional experts should be kept current. The once-excellent Defense Intelligence Agency regional studies series, *Country Studies*, might be reinvigorated. A complete set should be available to all units tasked for OOTW. Also, prior to the operation, Special Forces personnel, LANDSAT, and national overhead resources should be used to gather preliminary data about terrain, and during the operation, civil affairs personnel and liaison officers to local political institutions and organizations should continue the process of gathering information about local power structures, customs, values, and military and political practices.

3. Officers are not adequately educated about other agencies' missions or capabilities.

Officers should receive orientation packages regarding the missions and capabilities of those executive branch agencies and NGOs with which they are likely to work in a theater of operations. Furthermore, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) might acquaint officers more thoroughly with the roles, functions, and capabilities of other executive branch agencies with which the officers might operate in the future. The Army should develop closer liaison at all levels—as well as joint exercises and education—with (among others) the Departments of State and Justice, the national intelligence agencies, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Drug Enforcement Agency in order to acquaint Army officers fully with their capabilities.

4. Intelligence-gathering is critical in OOTW.

The importance of exploiting contacts with other agencies and the local population should be made clear to U.S. soldiers, as should the need for subtlety in such efforts so as to avoid aggravating local sensitivities. Commanders must become acquainted with the capabilities of all intelligence-collection disciplines.

5. Many OOTW will probably be conducted on urban terrain, which has very different requirements than warfare on open-broken terrain, especially when restrictive rules of engagement further complicate the conduct of the operation.

Soldiers should be better prepared for alternative modes of operation when restrictive ROE preclude preferred combat techniques or the standard use of artillery or air support. Moreover, units expecting to operate on urban terrain (especially in a hostile environment) might benefit from the ability to read schematic diagrams, blueprints, and similar plans in the event they need to control or manipulate utilities (e.g., to deprive the enemy of services, gain control of a restive population). Facility with such plans would enable the unit to operate in the sewer system, navigate open canals, and to control water and electricity. To date, most unconventional MOUT exercises take place in relatively

small training areas. Few units encounter widely varied types of urban terrain. Many MOUT training facilities are rudimentary, and others are patterned after small villages. Future OOTW MOUT training should anticipate a representative cross-section of worldwide urban centers such as Istanbul, San Salvador, Panama City, Nairobi, Cairo, Port-au-Prince, or Bratislava.

6. Advanced collective skills not exercised in the conduct of OOTW will quickly deteriorate.

Refresher training in advanced collective skills at CTCs should be made available to units—especially armor, artillery, and mechanized infantry—returning from OOTW deployments.

DOCTRINE

Until recently, Army doctrine relevant to OOTW was restricted to some SOF and conventional MOUT doctrine, and to two field manuals on low intensity conflict (LIC): Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (1990), and FM 7-98, *Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (1992). The two LIC manuals, however, are very general, and tend to emphasize counterinsurgency (COIN), internal defense and development (IDAD), and counternarcotics (CN) over other OOTW. Moreover, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 has generated a great deal of confusion over the term LIC, by using it variously to represent an environment, a set of operations, and the low end of a conflict spectrum. By late 1992, the manuals had become outdated, and the Army was considering replacing the idea(s) of LIC with the concepts of military operations short of war (MOSW), hostilities other than war (HOOTW), military operations other than war (MOOTW) and, finally, OOTW. Meanwhile, COIN and CN were becoming less prominent as humanitarian operations, disaster relief, and peacekeeping increased with the end of the Cold War. In its 1993 keystone doctrine FM 100-5, *Operations*, the Army responded to these changes in requirements by including as the manual's penultimate chapter eight pages on OOTW.

Since that time, the Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, has been published, and other doctrine was being written or revised in

1994 to reflect OOTW requirements as well. The Army is in the process of updating FM 100-20, *Military Operations Other Than War*, which will replace FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. Field Manuals 71-2 and 71-3, *The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force* and *Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*, specifically consider operations other than war; FM 100-7, *Decisive Force*, describes how to establish linkages with other services, civilian governmental agencies, and NGOs; FM 100-8, *Combined Army Operations*, will be the Army's capstone manual for coalitional operations; FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, will address force projection issues in both war and OOTW; FM 100-16, *Army Operational Support*, focuses on logistics and support, and it reflects the special needs of contingency operations; and FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*, is especially relevant to domestic disaster relief and counternarcotics efforts, and it emphasizes interagency coordination. Joint doctrine includes the January 7, 1995 draft of Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, which is being staffed for revision; Joint Pub 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Foreign Internal Defense*, which is due in final form in June 1995; Joint Pub 3-07.2, *JTTP for Antiterrorism*, which is currently in the final assessment stage; an approved draft of Joint Pub 3-07.3, *JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)*, which will be replaced by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict's (CLIC) new version called *JTTP for Peace Operations*, which expands the original doctrine to include peace enforcement; Joint Pub 3-07.5, *JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)*, a second, October 1994, draft of which is currently being staffed; an initial draft of Joint Pub 3-07.6, *JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*; and Joint Pub 3-07.7, *JTTP for Domestic Support Operations*, for which a program directive was issued on March 14, 1995.

Despite the obvious progress in doctrine, this project's case studies indicate that some doctrinal points (or at least derivatives of principles of war) require additional attention and elucidation. Below we list some of these requirements—and suggested solutions.

1. **Unity of effort/unity of command and parsimony in command arrangements are required in OOTW, yet some of the case studies showed Army units subordinated to convoluted chains of**

command that complicated timely sharing of intelligence and transmission of new ROE.

Although conventional doctrine addresses issues of joint, combined, and interagency operations, doctrine relevant to OOTW must additionally emphasize constructive military relations with NGOs; civil-military operations; special operations forces' coordination with conventional infantry, armor, and artillery; coordination with USAID, the U.S. State Department, police, and other U.S. civilian governmental agencies for missions involving stability operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping; and effective relations with coalition partners through the use of dedicated liaison officers, advisers, and trainers.

- 2. In many OOTW, infrastructure damage or civilian deaths could jeopardize the political goals guiding the operation.**

Doctrine for OOTW must emphasize the possible political requirement for minimum use of force and restricted firepower.

- 3. Because OOTW operations are so heavily political and can shift quickly in their focus and intent, combat troops might easily find themselves in situations where negotiations or assistance to local civilians are required, but U.S. specialists are not available.**

OOTW-relevant doctrine must prepare combat troops to assume duties that might otherwise fall to civilians, combat support/ combat service support forces, or special operators. Indeed, this kind of versatility is just one example of the flexibility and adaptability that needs to be built into OOTW-related doctrine and taught to NCOs and officers of all grades.

- 4. OOTW are likely to take place in cities.**

Doctrine for MOUT must be adapted for situations with restrictive rules of engagement, where snipers, rioting, and looting—as well as requirements for clearing buildings, controlling refugees, and maintaining stability—could challenge conventional infantrymen's skills and abilities, consume manpower, and require more military police and civil affairs personnel than are available.

5. Doctrine must provide for adequate force protection on a non-linear battlefield in a volatile conflict environment where threats escalate, dissolve, and reemerge.

Force protection must incorporate use of PSYOP and shows of force; all of the intelligence disciplines, but especially HUMINT; counterterrorist precautions; defense against weapons of mass destruction, in some cases; and protection for the higher numbers of U.S. civilians and CS/CSS personnel who can be expected to participate in such OOTW as peacekeeping, stability operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

CONCLUSIONS

Operations other than war provide a unique set of challenges to the U.S. Army specifically, and to the U.S. military more generally. Their nature is changing as the world is changing; for example, it is now more likely that they will take place in urban settings, or that they will have humanitarian components. Additional requirements and concerns arise when such operations are conducted in dynamic operational environments or with unclear or shifting political guidance. Operations fall into the four categories illustrated in Figure 1.

The U.S. military has proved its ability to acquit itself respectably in those operations that fall into the upper left-hand box. These simply require continued attention to the evolving nature of OOTW, so that force structure, training, equipment, and doctrine can be adapted to changing operational requirements. As discussed in Chapter Three, operations falling into any of the remaining three boxes, particularly the lower right-hand one, demand attention not only to the changing needs of OOTW generally, but to the special requirements imposed by the potential for rapid change in threat and mission.

The upper right-hand box is particularly instructive: when Turkish forces invaded Cyprus in 1974 following a coup attempt by Greek Cypriots, the UN force in the country—part of a peacekeeping operation that had been in place since 1964—deliberately chose not to become involved in the combat, except to keep the Nicosia airport open. It waited until the situation resolved itself, then resumed its peacekeeping activities. This restraint made continuation of the UN peacekeeping operation possible. Had the multinational force become involved, it would have lost its neutrality and become an active

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		Operational environment	
		Static	Dynamic
Political objectives	Clear	Somalia (OPR, OPH) Bangladesh Panama Kuwait Kurdistan Sinai (UNEF I & II) Lebanon (MNF I)	Cyprus 1974
	Unclear		Lebanon (MNF II) Somalia (OCH)

Figure 1—Intersection of Political and Operational Considerations

participant in the conflict. This would have threatened not only the UN effort in Cyprus, but the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping more generally. The UN force's restraint was possible because the UN's political objectives—and, distilled from those, its military objectives—were clear and immutable.

The lower left-hand box could arguably hold Bosnia: the operational environment in Bosnia is undeniably war, and the military requirements are relatively predictable. On the other hand, the United States' political goals in that conflict are not well defined and could not effectively guide military planning.

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti would probably fall into the lower right-hand box. The operational environment was unpredictable and unstable. U.S. political objectives were extremely broad and amorphous. The operational environment in Haiti required sufficient contingency planning for reinforcement or withdrawal of deployed U.S. forces, as well as sufficient attention to all the factors mentioned in Chapter Two, including humanitarian needs, infra-

structure preservation, and related concerns. Lessons for Haiti could be derived from both Operation Just Cause (effectiveness of shows of force, MOUT requirements, need to effectively coordinate stability operations with combat operations) and Operation Sea Angel (carefully limited missions and advantages of offshore basing).

Rwanda would probably fall into the upper right-hand box. Although the situation is dynamic and volatile, U.S. forces operated there with an extremely limited mandate. This allowed them to achieve some positive humanitarian results but kept them from being drawn into a conflict they could not hope to contain or control. Yet U.S. forces are nonetheless tempting targets, and one must ask what would have happened had a U.S. aircraft been shot down or U.S. soldiers ambushed. Can the United States' resolve to keep an operation limited be strong enough to allow it to simply withdraw its forces rather than retaliate and become drawn into the conflict?

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